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SHEATHING THE SWORD OF FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION 
Ronald D. Rotunda • 
It was not too long ago that federal preemption-the doctrine 
that federal law overrides state laws which "impair federal superin-
tendence of the field" even though Congress has not expressed its 
intent with any clarity'-was a sword which federal courts used 
with some regularity.2 In the closing months of his presidency, 
Ronald Reagan issued an Executive Order intended to sheath this 
sword. This directive was analogous to the requirement of an envi-
ronmental impact statement.3 It required executive departments 
and agencies to prepare "Preemption Impact Statements." The Or-
der provided, in part, that-
To the extent permitted by law, Executive departments and agencies shall con-
strue, in regulations and otherwise, a Federal Statute to preempt State law only 
when the statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other 
firm and palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the Congress intended 
preemption of state law, or when the exercise of State authority directly conflicts 
with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal statute .... 
Any regulatory preemption of State law shall be restricted to the minimum level 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the statute pursuant to which the regulations 
are promulgated. 4 
The actual impact of this Executive Order may be far from 
earthshaking-not only because it expressly precludes any judicial 
review of its requirements,s but more significantly, because the 
• Professor of Law, University of Illinois. 
I. I R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 12.1, at 624 (1986) (hereinafter ROTUNDA, NOWAK & 
YOUNG]. 
2. For citation of cases, see id. at 624-29. 
3. On environmental impact statements, see generally Calvert Cllifs' Coordinating 
Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), discussing the provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act. See a/so R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN 
A NUTSHELL 21-54 (1983). 
4. Executive Order No. 12,612 (October 26, 1987), §§ 4(a), (c) (emphasis added), re-
printed in 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987). 
5. /d. at§ 8. 
Judicial Review. This Order is intended only to improve the internal manage-
ment of the Executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, 
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, 
its agencies, its officers, or any person. 
311 
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Supreme Court, in its more recent cases, had already anticipated its 
strong presumption against preemption. A careful analysis of the 
current cases offers strong evidence that the trend of the law is in-
creasingly moving away from preemption. In recent years, the 
Supreme Court has already gone far towards keeping the preemp-
tion blade in its sheath. Or, to shift, metaphors, before a plaintiff is 
able to convince a federal court to rule in favor of preemption, that 
plaintiff must overcome new, higher barriers, jump over more 
hurdles. 
The mere fact that Congress has the constitutional power to 
preempt an area does not mean that it has done so. That has long 
been the law. The leading decision of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp.,6 neatly summarizes the test for preemption: 
[S]tate law can be pre-empted in either of two general ways. [First,] If Congress 
evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is 
pre-empted. [Second,] If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over 
the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts 
with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal 
law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress. 7 
A federal administrative regulation may also preempt state law, if 
the federal agency is "acting within the scope of its congressionally 
delegated authority . . . . "s 
This summary of the test is not new. What is new is the vigor 
with which the Court applies it in specific fact situations. The 
Court has set up an obstacle course which must be crossed before 
preemption is reached. Let us now examine some of these obstacles 
in more detail, in connection first with the "intent to preempt" 
prong of the preemption test, and then with the "actual conflict" 
prong. 
I 
The first prong requires some showing of an intent to preempt. 
The mere existence of a federal statute or administrative regulation 
furnishes, by itself, no evidence that Congress intended to preempt 
concurrent state regulatory activities in the same area. Under such 
a system of dual regulation, a person or entity planning to engage in 
certain regulated activities must pass two hurdles: first, it must se-
cure the federal agency's permission, and second, it must also ob-
tain state regulatory clearance. For example, federally licensed 
6. 464 u.s. 238 (1984). 
7. /d. at 248 (internal citations omitted). 
8. Louisiana Public Service Comm. v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986). 
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seagoing vessels may still be compelled to meet local pollution 
standards. 9 
A leading case illustrating the Court's easy acceptance of con-
current regulation is Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. 
PauJ.w The Court upheld a California standard regarding the ma-
turity of avocados even though the statute was applied to exclude 
certain Florida avocados from California markets. These Florida 
avocados had been certified to be mature under federal regulations 
but did not meet the stricter California requirements regarding ma-
turity. Florida Lime explicitly rejected the argument "that a federal 
license or certificate of compliance with minimum standards immu-
nizes the licensed commerce from inconsistent or more demanding 
regulations." The Court admitted that this argument draws some 
support from earlier cases involving interstate carriers, but in mod-
em times, the Justices announced, this "suggestion has been signifi-
cantly qualified." 11 
The fact that a federal agency issues regulations governing cer-
tain activities also does not suggest that state regulations governing 
that area are preempted. First, the Court has required that the fed-
eral agency, like Congress, speak clearly. Indeed, if the federal reg-
ulations contemplate concurrent state regulations, then the federal 
regulations furnish authority against the existence of federal pre-
emption.l2 Even if an agency explicitly preempts state regulations, 
the Court requires clear and specific statutory authority for the 
agency's action. 
In Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC,IJ for example, 
the FCC argued that its orders regarding the depreciation of tele-
phone plant and equipment preempted inconsistent state regulation. 
The Court, however, found that the congressional statutory scheme 
9. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). See also California 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987) (a state statute which requires 
employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy does not 
conflict with federal law which specifies that illegal sex discrimination includes discrimination 
on the basis of pregnancy); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of 
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (upholding injunction, as violative of state trespass laws, of 
labor picketing which is arguably but not definitely protected by federal law). 
10. 373 u.s. 132 (1963). 
II. Id. at 141-42 (citing with approval Huron Portland Cement Co., and other cases). 
12. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 255 & n.l7. See also California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite 
Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1426 (1987) ("If, as Granite Rock claims, it is the federal intent 
that Granite Rock conduct its mining unhindered by any state environmental regulation, one 
would expect to find the expression of this intent in these Forest Service regulations."); Hills-
borough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985) ("be-
cause agencies normally address problems in a detailed manner and can speak through a 
variety of means, ... we can expect that they will make their intentions clear if they intend 
for their regulations to be exclusive."). 
13. 476 U.S. 355 (I 986). 
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contemplated "a dual regulatory system."I4 Although "the broad 
language" of one section in the federal statute "no doubt, [makes it] 
possible to find some support" in favor of preemption, the Court did 
not find that section sufficiently "unambiguous or straight-forward" 
in light of the entire federal statutory scheme. "Nor is the word 
'pre-emption' used" in the section relied on to support the power of 
the federal agency to preempt.Is 
In short, if a federal statutory scheme contemplates a dual fed-
eral-state regulatory system, if the federal statutes, when read as a 
whole, do not require preemption and do not even use the word 
"preemption," and if the agency regulations contemplate concur-
rent state regulations, then any arguments favoring preemption 
should fail. In Louisiana Public Service Comm 'n, for example, the 
Court refused to find preemption even though those favoring pre-
emption had argued (1) that "the FCC is entitled to preempt incon-
sistent state regulation which frustrates federal policy,"I6 and 
(2) that "the refusal of the States to accept the FCC-set depreciation 
schedules and rules will frustrate the federal policy of increasing 
competition in the industry, and thus that (3) state regulation 
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.' "11 
Even if the federal agency does not issue a preemptive regula-
tion, Congress can always preempt, but the modem trend is to re-
quire Congress to speak with absolute clarity. 
In Florida Lime, for example, the Court said that the "princi-
14. /d. at 370 (emphasis in original). 
15. /d. at 377. 
16. /d. at 368. 
17. Id at 368-69. Another important recent example is California Coastal Comm'n v. 
Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987). Federal law allows private citizens to enter federal 
land in order to explore for mineral deposits. If the private citizen locates such a deposit, he 
may perfect his claim by complying with various federal requirements. If the claimant so 
complies, the federal government retains legal title to the land, but the claimant "shall have 
the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of 
their locations .... " 30 U.S.C.A. § 26 (1986) (emphasis added). In addition, the claimant 
may secure a land patent; if he does, he obtains legal title to the land. Thus, although Granite 
Rock Co. had secured federal approval of its mining plans on federal land, it could not begin 
mining until it secured a permit from the California Coastal Commission. Granite Rock 
attacked the state permit requirement on its face. 
In Granite Rock, the Court held that the claimant who owns an unpatented mining 
claim must pass another hurdle; he must still comply with California's permit requirement. 
In so holding, it rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that "an independent state permit 
system to enforce state environmental standards would undermine the Forest Service's own 
permit authority and thus is preempted." Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 
768 F.2d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 1985). The Solicitor General supported Granite Rock's argu-
ments for preemption. The Supreme Court majority emphasized that if an administrative 
regulation declares an intention to preempt, it must do so "with some specificity." Granite 
Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 1426. This regulatory scheme did not. 
1988] PREEMPTION 315 
pie to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation of a 
field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regula-
tory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the na-
ture of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or 
that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained."ts A long line of 
cases since then has reemphasized that Congress must state its in-
tention clearly. "It will not be presumed that a federal statute was 
intended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state unless 
there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise of 
federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed."t9 
In determining whether Congress has spoken with sufficient 
clarity, the Court has given the party claiming preemption the bur-
den of proof. The party seeking preemption must meet this burden 
by demonstrating, with specificity, an intent to preempt. The 
Silkwood decision makes this point quite clearly. 
Silkwood is a striking illustration of the new reluctance to pre-
empt. Pursuant to state tort law, the estate of Karen Silkwood sued 
the Kerr-McGee Corporation for damages caused by exposure to 
plutonium from Kerr-McGee's federally licensed nuclear facility. 
The only issue before the Court was whether federal nuclear safety 
regulations preempted a ten million dollar punitive damage award. 
In the previous Term the Court had held that the states were pre-
empted from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear energy.2o The 
Court had broadly concluded that the "Federal Government has 
occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the lim-
ited powers expressly ceded to the States."2t 
Based on this recent precedent, Kerr-McGee argued that com-
pliance with federal safety regulations precluded the award of puni-
18. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (emphasis 
added). 
19. New York State Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,413 (1973) (quoting 
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-Q3 (1952)). See also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Mary-
land, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978)("This Court is generally reluctant to infer preemption .... "). 
In Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987), the Court held that a Maine 
statute requiring employers to provide a one-time severance payment to employees if there is 
a plant closing was not preempted by either ERISA or the NLRA. ERISA explicitly pro-
vided that it preempts: "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to 
any employee benefit plan .... " 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (1984). Nonetheless, the majority 
refused to find preemption because they read "plan" to refer to an administrative scheme 
rather than to a one-time lump-sum payment. The majority also ruled that there was no 
preemption under the NLRA. Justice White joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia, 
dissented: "The Court's 'administrative-scheme' rationale provides states with a means of 
circumventing congressional intent, clearly expressed in § 1144, to pre-empt all state laws 
that relate to employee benefit plans." 107 S. Ct. at 2225. 
20. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 
461 u.s. 190 (1983). 
21. /d.at212. 
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tive damages to Silkwood's estate. The Tenth Circuit agreed. Its 
reasoning was straightforward. If the states are preempted from 
regulating nuclear safety directly, they cannot regulate it indirectly 
via punitive damage awards, because the purpose of punitive dam-
ages is to punish bad practices and to deter future similar prac-
tices.22 The primary purpose of punitive damages (like the purpose 
of regulation) is not to compensate the victim but to change the 
behavior of the defendant. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court refused to find preemption: 
"Kerr-McGee focuses on the differences between compensatory and 
punitive damages awards and asserts that, at most, Congress in-
tended to allow the former. This argument, however, is misdirected 
because our inquiry is not whether Congress expressly allowed pu-
nitive damages awards. . . . [I]t is Kerr-McGee's burden to show 
that Congress intended to preclude such awards. "23 
There was no dispute that Kerr-McGee was "subject to exclu-
sive NRC safety regulation .... ",24 and that Congress "prohibit[ed] 
the States from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear development 
.... "2s The Court noted that the states were not competent to deal 
with technical safety considerations. Still, the Supreme Court re-
fused to find preemption because it said that there was "ample evi-
dence that Congress had no intention of forbidding the States to 
provide [punitive damage] remedies."26 What was this ample 
evidence? 
First there was congressional "silence. "27 Second, the Court 
found it significant that Congress did not provide "any federal rem-
edy for persons injured by such conduct."2s To which "conduct" 
was the Court referring? The evidence showed that Kerr-McGee's 
only violations of any regulations during the relevant time "was its 
failure to maintain a record of the dates of two urine samples sub-
mitted by Silkwood."29 Thus when Silkwood states that Congress 
provided no federal remedies from "such conduct," it appears to 
suggest that Congress provided for no remedies from radiation inju-
ries which were not causally related to violation of any federal stat-
ute or rules; no one, after all, claimed that Karen Silkwood was 
injured because Kerr-McGee did not record the dates of two urine 
22. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 246 (1984). 
23. /d. at 255. 
24. /d. at 250 n.ll. 
25. /d. at 250. 
26. /d. at 251. 
27. /d. 
28. /d. In contrast, not only did Oklahoma provide for punitive damages as well as for 
actual damages; it also provided for strict liability. /d. at 245. 
29. /d. at 244; see id. at 262 & n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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samples. Third, the Silkwood majority, in finding no preemption, 
also relied on the Price-Anderson Act (which set a limit on state 
law suits arising out of a nuclear accident), even though the Court 
cheerfully conceded that the Act "does not apply to the present sit-
uation .... "Jo 
The Court also rejected the position advocated by the United 
States-that state punitive damage claims are preempted because 
the NRC is authorized to impose civil penalties if federal standards 
have been violated: 
[T]he award of punitive damages in the present case does not conflict with that 
scheme. Paying both federal fines and state-imposed punitive damages for the same 
incident would not appear to be physically impossible. Nor does exposure to puni-
tive damages frustrate any purpose of the federal remedial scheme.31 
We thus end up with an ironic result. Because the Court had 
found that the states lack the technological expertise to impose 
modest civil fines on a nuclear facility, it ruled that state regulation 
of nuclear safety is preempted. Yet a randomly selected jury may 
impose a ten million dollar punitive damage award if the nuclear 
facility does not measure up to a jury's ex post facto decision as to 
what constitutes adequate safety procedures.32 
Silkwood, in short, highlights the extreme reluctance of the 
modem Court to find preemption. Preemption exists if Congress 
clearly and explicitly provides for it by statute. Otherwise, if it is 
possible for the party to comply both with the federal law and the 
state regulation-if such dual compliance is not "physically impos-
sible"-then the Court is unlikely to find preemption.JJ 
II 
Apart from passing the "intent to preempt" hurdle, a state law 
must also avoid "actual conflict" with federal law. There are two 
ways to determine whether a state law is preempted because "it ac-
tually conflicts with federal law." First, there is preemption (and 
state law "actually conflicts" with federal law) if it is impossible to 
comply with both state and federal law. If dual compliance is not 
"physically impossible," as in Silkwood, there is no "actual con-
flict." Second, state law "actually conflicts" with federal law 
"where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."J4 
30. /d. at 251. 
31. /d. at 257. 
32. See id. at 260 (Blackmon, J., dissenting). 
33. Note also that the Solicitor General argued in favor of preemption. /d. at 257. 
34. /d. at 248. 
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CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,Js is a striking example of the 
Court's reluctance to find that state law interferes with the "full 
purposes and objectives of Congress." Any obstacles that the state 
sets up must be fairly high before the Court will infer preemption. 
In CTS the Court upheld an Indiana law which in effect severely 
limited hostile corporate takeovers. The practical effect of the law 
as applied to corporations incorporated in Indiana was that a take-
over required prior approval of a majority of the preexisting disin-
terested shareholders. The district court and the court of appeals 
each held that the Williams Act, a federal law regulating takeovers, 
preempted the state law. As the Seventh Circuit noted: "Very few 
tender offers could run the gauntlet that Indiana has set up. "36 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found no preemption. 
The Court first quickly dismissed, in one sentence, the conten-
tion that it was impossible to comply with both the state and federal 
law: "Because it is entirely possible for entities to comply with both 
the Williams Act and the Indiana Act, the state statute can be pre-
empted only if it frustrates the purpose of the federallaw."J7 Then 
the Court turned to the question whether the Indiana law was an 
obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 
The Court assumed that the purpose of the Williams Act was 
to strike "a careful balance between the interests of offerors and 
target companies, and that any state statute that upset this balance 
35. 107 s. Ct. 1637 (1987). 
36. Dynamics Corp. v. CfS Corp., 749 F.2d 250, 263 (7th Cir. 1986). It is difficult to 
overemphasize the significance of CTS. Takeovers were one of the major forces behind the 
1987 bull market in stocks. The CTS decision and other restrictions on takeovers were 
widely viewed as one of the causes leading to the stock market crash of October 19, 1987. As 
a Wall Street Journal analysis noted: 
No one [at first] had paid much attention, but the underpinnings of the take-
over boom had undergone even more severe erosion. In April, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in a surprising decision [the CTS case], upheld an Indiana statute plainly 
designed to curb hostile takeovers of Indiana corporations. The ruling seemed to 
sanctify other anti-takeover statutes and led to the passage of similar laws in other 
states. 
Congress, meanwhile, was considering its own package of legislation to curb 
takeovers. The proposed tax bill would repeal many tax breaks related to takeovers 
and could halt highly leveraged deals. 
Even without legislative curbs, there was growing uneasiness that the takeover 
boom was nearing an end. As the prices of such deals and the corresponding debt 
loads grew ever higher, even a whilf of recession-triggered by higher interest rates, 
inftation or a weaker dollar-raised the specter of widespread defaults by debt-rid-
den companies. Heading into October, the pace of takeovers had turned down from 
the year before. 
Stewart & Hertzberg, The Crash of'87: Before the Fall. (Part/}, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 1987, at 
14, col. 1. See also Smith, Swartz, & Anders, The Crash of '87: Black Monday, (Part II), 
Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 6. 
37. 107 S. Ct. at 1644. 
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was preempted."Js Nonetheless the Court ruled that the Williams 
Act did not preempt the Indiana law. The purpose of the state law, 
said the Court, was not to favor management against offerors, to the 
detriment of shareholders; such a purpose would upset the balance 
struck by the Williams Act. Instead, the Indiana law "protects the 
independent shareholder against both of the contending parties."39 
Thus, the purpose of the Indiana law did not frustrate federal law, 
even though-in the words of the Seventh Circuit quoted above--
"Very few tender offers could run the gauntlet that Indiana has set 
up."40 
In CTS the state law limited the competition in takeovers. Yet 
even before CTS it was clear that federal law does not preempt state 
law simply because the federal law provides for more competition 
than the state law would accept. In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of 
Maryland,4t for example, the Court upheld a Maryland statute 
prohibiting oil producers or refiners from operating retail gas ser-
vice stations within the state and requiring them to extend all tem-
porary price reductions uniformly to all stations that they supply. 
The Court held that the congressional expression in favor of vigor-
ous competition found in the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Pat-
man Act did not directly or indirectly preempt the Maryland law. 
The Court said that the existence of hypothetical conflicts was too 
38. /d. at 1645. 
39. !d. 
40. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), follows a similar methodology and analysis. 
It held that federal law did not preempt a California law which provided criminal penalties if 
an employer knowingly employed an illegal alien if such employment would adversely affect 
lawful resident workers. The unanimous Court conceded that the power to regulate immigra-
tion is an exclusive federal power, but argued that not all state regulation of aliens is a regula-
tion of immigration. Nor does the "comprehensiveness of the INA scheme for regulation" 
demand preemption. Congress, it was true, had failed (as of that time) to enact any general 
laws criminalizing knowing employment of illegal aliens. Still, the DeCanas Court refused to 
find preemption. It found no evidence that Congress " 'unmistakably ... ordained' exclusiv-
ity of federal regulation in this field." 424 U.S. at 361. The Court also found persuasive a 
reference in the Federal Labor Contractor Registration Act that referred to "appropriate 
State law and regulation," although, the Court admitted, this Act was "concerned only with 
agricultural employment." /d. at 362. In DeCanas, as in Silkwood, the Solicitor General also 
argued that this state law was not appropriate because it conflicted with federal regulation. 
/d. at 362 n.ll. 
DeCanas conceded that the federal statute making it a felony to harbor illegal entrants 
also provided that employment of such illegal entrants does not constitute harboring. The 
Court did not even consider the argument that Congress may have refused to define employ-
ment as harboring because of a careful balance of competing interests: the national interest in 
protecting local employment versus the foreign affairs interest in not antagonizing a petro-
leum rich neighbor whose citizens constitute a large part of this country's illegal immigrants. 
In such circumstances, it would appear that the Court's approval of the California law under-
mines the federal purpose. 
41. 437 u.s. 117 (1978). 
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speculative to warrant preemption.42 
The Court in Exxon v. Governor also reasoned that, in inter-
preting the Clayton Act, it "is illogical to infer that by excluding 
certain competitive behavior from the general ban against discrimi-
natory pricing, Congress intended to pre-empt the States' power to 
prohibit any conduct within that exclusion. This Court is generally 
reluctant to infer pre-emption. "43 The appellants argued that the 
Maryland statute "'undermin[es]' the competitive balance that 
Congress struck between the Robinson-Patman and Sherman 
Acts."44 The Court did not so much dispute this argument as find 
it irrelevant: 
This is merely another way of stating that the Maryland statute will have an an-
ticompetitive effect. In this sense, there is a conflict between the statute and the 
central policy of the Sherman Act-our "charter of economic liberty." Neverthe-
less, this sort of conflict cannot itself constitute a sufficient reason for invalidating 
the Maryland statute. For if an adverse effect on competition were, in and of itself, 
enough to render a state statute invalid, the States' power to engage in economic 
regulation would be effectively destroyed. 4S 
The Court then found that the Maryland statute, even though it 
had an anticompetitive effect, did not stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of congressional objectives. 
III 
In general, the party claiming preemption has the burden of 
proof. As we have seen, this burden is now quite heavy. In meeting 
this burden, the party must persuade the Court that preemption is 
proper in one of two general ways. 
First, Congress (or a federal agency, if authorized by Congress 
to do so), may expressly preempt an area of concern, thereby pre-
cluding any state regulation. Because the Court "is generally reluc-
tant to infer preemption,"46 Congress must speak clearly and make 
its intention to preempt unmistakable. If a federal agency claims 
preemption, it must also speak clearly in its regulations. If the fed-
eral scheme contemplates a dual regulatory system and the federal 
statutes do not explicitly provide for preemption, the federal courts 
will likely find that the federal agency has no authority to preempt 
even if its regulations so provide. 
Alternatively, the party must demonstrate that federal law 
42. /d. at 130-31. 
43. /d. at 132. 
44. Id. at 133. 
45. Jd. at 133 (internal citation omitted). 
46. E.g., id. at 132, and cases cited therein. 
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preempts state law to the extent that the state law "actually con-
flicts with federal law." If it is possible to comply with both state 
and federal law, there is no "actual conflict." Similarly, there is no 
"actual conflict" unless the state law frustrates the purposes of the 
federal law. This standard is not easy to meet. For example, as the 
cases discussed above show, a state law does not frustrate federal 
purposes merely because it provides for less competition, or requires 
that federally licensed vessels in interstate commerce also meet local 
pollution standards, or prohibits items transported in interstate 
commerce that do not meet state maturity standards which are set 
higher than federal maturity standards. In all these cases, the state 
requirements place hurdles in the way of federal regulation, but 
these hurdles are not treated as improper when the Court finds that 
Congress did not intend to preclude concurrent state and federal 
regulations. 
The Court's recent reluctance to infer preemption may be part 
of a broader tendency to shift primary responsibility to Congress in 
deciding when states should be powerless to act in a given area. If 
Congress wishes to preempt, it may certainly do so, merely by ex-
pressing its intentions clearly. The Court's recent preemption cases 
may be signalling that, out of respect for federalism, the more dem-
ocratic branches of the central government should be preferred to 
make the primary decisions limiting the power of the states to regu-
late concurrently with the federal government.47 Power and re-
sponsibility should go together like pepper and salt. Because 
Congress has the ultimate power to decide preemption cases-Con-
gress after all can always overrule the Court on this question-Con-
gress ought to exercise this power unambiguously and shoulder the 
ultimate responsibility as well. 48 
47. ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG supra note I, at§ 12.1 See a/so id. at§ II. I. 
48. Cf Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), holding that a state court must make 
clear that it is deciding a case only on state grounds in order to persuade a federal court that 
no federal questions need to be decided because the state grounds are adequate and independ-
ent. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Long established an important principle of 
federalism: states should not be bound by phantom federal restrictions. If a state court 
wishes to impose constitutional restrictions on the state, it may certainly do so, and if those 
restrictions are based on the state constitution, the federal courts will not interfere simply 
because the state court has gone further in creating constitutional rights (based on the state 
constitution) than a federal court would have gone (based on the U.S. Constitution). But if 
state courts are going to create rights, they must take the responsibility for doing so and 
unambiguously decide the case on state law grounds. Otherwise, state courts could, in effect, 
blame the federal Constitution for imposing what are really phantom constitutional restric-
tions on state government. In order to unleash the states from these phantom federal restric-
tions, the Supreme Court reviews such cases only where state courts have created 
constitutional rights purportedly (and ambiguously) relying on the federal Constitution. 
